Construction starts of skyscrapers predict subsequent US stock returns. The predictive ability exceeds that of alternatives such as the prevailing historical mean, predictions based on dividend ratios and recently suggested combination forecasts. One explanation for these patterns is that tower building is indicative of over-optimism; alternatively, tower building could help to identify periods of low risk aversion. I present indirect evidence that is consistent with both explanations. JEL classification: G12, G14 *I am very grateful for comments received from the referee and the editors as well as from Erik Theissen and conference and seminar participants in Hamburg (German Finance Association), Hannover (Leibniz University) and Rome (IFABS).
I. Introduction
Ever since the story of the tower of Babel was recorded, the construction of large towers has been associated with human hubris. From a finance theory perspective, towers are large-scale projects with uncertain future cash flows and large funding requirements. These observations suggest two reasons why tower building might predict low future stock market returns. Either it indicates periods in which over-optimism has led to overvalued stock markets, or it helps to identify times of low risk aversion. (With low risk premia, funding costs for large-scale projects are lower, while future stock market returns are expected to be relatively low as well.) An example that illustrates both interpretations is the Chicago Spire, which had a planned height of 609 meters.
1 Construction of the Chicago Spire began in June 2007, a time in which (i) risk premia -as exemplified by low credit spreads -were low, and (ii) valuation levels appear to have been relatively high. Though the Chicago Spire stands out because of its planned height, it is representative of the many high-rise buildings planned that year. The number of towers taller than 100 meters that were started to be built in 2007 was more than twice the annual average of such construction starts over the 20 years from 1987 to 2006. 2 In this paper, I therefore examine whether tower building is associated with lower subsequent stock market returns. Building activity is measured through construction starts of towers that exceed a trailing mean tower height. In the US, the predictive power of this measure compares favorably to the predictive power of the dividend price ratio, a variable that has been studied extensively in the literature (e.g. Welch and Goyal, 2008) , as well as to recently suggested combination forecasts (Rapach, Strauss and Zhou (2010) and Ferreira and Santa-Clara (2011) ).
Further analysis shows that international tower building activity predicts a world ex US stock market index.
The two possible explanations for the predictive content of tower building are difficult to separate empirically. Indirect evidence is consistent with both explanations. With rational asset pricing, forcing return forecasts to be non-negative should increase predictive accuracy, but the effects of such a constraint are mixed. Furthermore, both credit market conditions and sentiment variables explain construction starts of large towers.
The perception that tower building can be linked to economic as well as stock market performance is frequently voiced in the media. 3 Often, news articles cite the research report of Lawrence (1999) and follow-up reports, e.g. Lawrence, Hsu, Luo, and Chan (2012) . The only associated academic paper I found is Thornton (2005) , who discusses the relationship between tower building, business cycles and economic crises but does not conduct a statistical analysis. Barr (2010) empirically examines the determinants of skyscraper height and concludes that status plays a role, leading to heights that exceed the profit maximizing height.
There is a large body of literature on predicting stock markets with dividend ratios and other variables. Classical references are Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Fama and French (1988) .
Recent contributions include Goyal and Welch (2003) , Malkiel (2004) , Fisher and Statman (2006) , Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (2008) , Thompson (2008), Cochrane (2008) , Welch and Goyal (2008) , Rapach, Strauss and Zhou (2010) and Ferreira and Santa-Clara (2011) . In the definition of variables, I focus on construction starts rather than on construction completions because construction starts should provide a better measure of the current situationbe it overvaluation or low risk premia. Several towers like the Chrysler Building and the Sears Tower were completed despite the fact that economic conditions worsened significantly after their start. In unreported analysis I re-defined the variables using the completion dates and found that the predictability is lower.
As a measure of US tower-building activity, I examine the number of towers exceeding a threshold defined by the trailing average height of large buildings. Since the height of large towers is trending upward over time, this appears superior to the use of a fixed threshold such as 100 meters. Specifically, I define the threshold to be the average height of buildings of over 50 meters that were built in the thirty-year interval before the year in question. Figure I shows the building activity as measured by LargeStart.
[INSERT FIGURE I HERE]
Stock market data are obtained from different sources. Annual US stock market returns, associated dividend information, and risk-free returns for the time period 1871 to 2010 are obtained from Robert Shiller's website. 6 For the 1926-2010 sub-period, annual data on the valueweighted market portfolio and dividend information are from CRSP, made available by Michael Roberts; 7 the risk-free rate that is used for the CRSP data is the one-month treasury bill rate taken from Ken French's website.
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In the literature on stock market predictability, dividend-based ratios are the most widely studied predictors for long-horizon stock market returns. I follow the literature and use the dividend price ratio, defined as the logarithm of dividends paid over the last year divided by the current index value; it will be denoted dp. Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010) and Ferreira and Santa-Clara (2011) , will be studied in the sensitivity analysis of Section IV.
Stock market returns enter the analysis as logarithmic excess returns over the risk-free rate, denoted by r t,t+k . In using log returns, I follow Fama and French (1988) and Welch and Goyal (2008) . One justification is the fact that log returns are closer to being normally distributed, which should increase the reliability of regression analysis.
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In line with the extant literature, predictability is analyzed through linear regressions.
Information contained in tower-building activities may be reflected with a time lag, but the variable capturing the building of large towers is highly autocorrelated by construction, 10 which is why I do not include further lags. Thus regressions are of the form:
For return horizons larger than one year (k>1), the return observations are overlapping, which induces correlations in the error terms. While ordinary least squares regression continues to yield consistent estimates of the coefficients b, standard errors are no longer reliable. Until recently, the common academic response was to use Newey and West (1987) standard errors. Ang and Bekaert (2007) , however, have shown that the Newey and West procedure is sensitive to time persistence in the explanatory variables. Through simulations, Ang and Bekaert (2007) show that Hodrick (1992) standard errors are much more reliable in regressions such as (1). With k>1, I
9 For the 1871-2010 data, regressing 5-year log returns on the dividend price ratio leads to residuals whose normality is not rejected by a skewness/kurtosis test (p-value = 0.615); with simple returns, normality of residuals is rejected (p-value=0.011). 10 The first-order autocorrelation is 0.82. In unreported analysis, I added a one-year lag of LargeStart. Across the specifications of I also will explore the out-of-sample performance of predictions based on regressions such as (1). One of the metrics examined is the out-of-sample R² suggested by Campbell and Thompson (2008) , which compares the mean squared error of a prediction model to the errors one would incur when using the historical mean prevailing at time t as a predictor. Let 
where m is the starting year of the out-of-sample analysis. If the 2 OS R is positive, the prediction model outperforms the prevailing mean, which serves as a natural benchmark for evaluating predictive performance. To assess the statistical significance of the out-of-sample R², I follow Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010) and favor the Clark and West (2007) MSPE-adjusted statistic over the Diebold-Mariano (1995) test, which can have low power when applied to nested models.
11 To compute the MSPE-adjusted statistic, define ( 
11 See the discussion in Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010) . The prevailing mean is nested in regression models of type (1) 
III. Tower Building and Stock Market Returns

In-Sample Analysis
To begin, I regress future stock market returns on the variable LargeStart. This specification, which I will call the tower model, is compared to a regression with just the dividend-price ratio (the dividend model), as well as to a regression that includes both variables (the dividend+tower model). Specifications are thus:
Dividend model:
Tower model:
Dividend+tower model: 
Out-of-Sample Analysis
An out-of-sample analysis mimics the situation of market participants who tried to use the information in predictive variables at a certain point τ in the past. To predict k-year returns starting at the end of year τ, one would run the regression (when using the tower model)
derive coefficient estimates b , and compute the prediction Predictions for the other two models are derived in the same fashion. By running regressions of type (7) for each τ considered in the analysis, one obtains a series of out-of-sample predictions.
Following the suggestion of Campbell and Thompson (2008) , I also examine the effects of imposing a non-negativity constraint on the prediction. The motivation is that expected excess returns on an asset exposed to systematic risk should be non-negative if the average investor is risk-averse. Since the returns r t.t+l are log returns, negative forecasts can be consistent with rationality as the relevant simple returns also depend on volatility. Assuming normally distributed log returns and estimating future volatilities with the standard errors of the predictive regressions leads to the following predictor that constrains predicted simple returns to be nonnegative:
where ) ( , k t t u + τ σ denotes the estimated standard error of a regression that is run to make a prediction from time τ.
The first date τ on which a prediction is made is chosen to be 1910. By then, there are least 35 observations for the regressions on which the predictions are based.
Out-of-sample performance will suffer if coefficient estimates are unstable. It is, therefore, illustrative to examine how coefficients change over time. Figure II In accordance with prior literature, the benchmark for assessing the predictive performance of a regression model is the prevailing historical mean. This predicts the return from τ to τ+k as follows:
Separately for each of the three regression models and the two return horizons, Figure III shows how the sum of squared prediction errors of a given regression model compares to the sum of squared prediction errors of the historical mean. Specifically, for a given year T, the cumulative relative squared prediction errors are determined as follows:
If the cumulative relative SSE is positive, the regression predictions perform better than does the simple prediction based on the historical mean. Starting with the overall performance from 1910-2010, it is evident from Figure III that the in-sample performance of the tower model carries over to the out-of-sample analysis. Predictive regressions using tower information lead to squared errors that are lower than those of the historical mean. In addition, the tower model is not surpassed by models that use the dividend price ratio as a single or additional variable.
These differences take some time to form. Until the 1940s, the tower model performance exhibits relatively large fluctuations, and is below benchmark for several years. Its consistency is largest for the five-year horizon. After World War II, the tower model leaves the benchmark behind.
Though there are some episodes in which the relative advantage recedes, the charts do not indicate that there is a lasting shift or break in the performance. Furthermore, results of the tower model do not critically depend on whether the non-negativity constraint is imposed. Differences are so small that often they are barely visible in the figure. Table 2 shows out-of-sample R² statistics, which are based on squared prediction errors as described in Section II, as well as mean absolute errors.
14 Results are presented for the 1910-2010 period and for several sub-periods. In each case, the estimation sample starts in 1871, and the Shiller data are used throughout. First of all, the statements derived from visual inspection of The differences between the errors of unconstrained and constrained predictors are interesting because they could help to differentiate between the two possible explanations for why tower building predicts returns. The constraint is motivated by an equilibrium approach. Even if riskaversion is very low, one would not expect risk premia to be negative since the stock market is not only risky, but also positively correlated with consumption risk. If tower building is indicative of overvaluation, by contrast, there is no reason for ruling out non-negative expected returns. For the tower models, results are mixed. Imposing the constraint tends to increase predictive performance for the one-year horizon and decrease it for the three-year horizon. In most cases, differences are relatively small. Thus, the equilibrium constraint does not help to decide between overvaluation or risk premia explanations for the predictive ability of tower information.
In order to assess the economic significance of superior predictive performance, one can examine the performance of portfolio strategies. I follow Campbell and Thompson (2008) , Welch and Goyal (2008) and Rapach, Strauss and Zhou (2010) and compute average utility differences between different strategies. To facilitate the interpretation and to avoid problems from estimating the variance of multi-period returns, 15 I examine annual portfolio returns.
Assuming that an investor has mean-variance preferences of the form
today's (today = τ) optimal equity investment w* is obtained through: 16 As in Campbell and Thompson (2008) , Welch and Goyal (2008) and Rapach, Strauss and Zhou (2010) , the risk-aversion parameter γ is set to 3 and portfolio weights are constrained to lie in the interval [0, 1.5] in order to rule out unrealistic strategies involving short-sales or heavy leverage. The same set of choices is made for a strategy based on the trailing historical mean. The only difference is that the expected return forecasts are replaced by the average excess return observed until year τ.
Let m j and s j ² denote the sample mean and variance of the returns from a portfolio strategy based on regression forecasts, while m 0 and S 0 ² denote the sample mean and variance of a strategy based on the trailing historical mean. The utility difference obtains as
Consider a situation in which the investor hires a fund manager to implement the strategy. The fund manager charges an annual management fee, determined as a percentage f of the current assets under management. This would reduce the strategy return by f, while not affecting the variance. Setting the fee f equal to the ∆U without the management fee would reduce the afterfee utility gain to zero. The utility difference in (14) can therefore be interpreted as the maximum annual management fee that the investor would be willing to pay for the use of regression-based forecasts. Table 3 Adding dividend information does not greatly change the utility compared to the tower model.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The utility gains suggest that the statistical significance documented in Table 2 goes along with economic significance. For example, the post-1945 utility gains are much larger than the expense ratios incurred by mutual fund investors during that period (cf. Latzko (1999) ).
Determinants of Tower Building
Two possible reasons for the predictive power of tower building are that (i) it captures credit market conditions, and therefore, risk aversion, and (ii) it proxies for market sentiment, and therefore, overvaluation. The analysis in the previous section produced evidence that is consistent with both explanations. In this section, the question shall be addressed from a different 17 It may seem surprising that the dividend-based strategy yields positive utility gains in periods in which the dividend model does not produce superior return predictions. The picture can be explained by noting that an investor can benefit from a trading strategy through both better average performance and reduced variance (cf. Welch and Goyal, 2008). angle. Examining whether tower building is related to credit market conditions or sentiment could shed light on the validity of the different explanations.
I use the following variables to capture credit market conditions:
• the annual change in the volume of real estate loans at all commercial banks, deflated with the US consumer price index (CPI). CPI as well as loan data from years following 1947 are from Federal Reserve Economic Data (Fred).
18 Loan data from years prior to 1947 are from the US All Bank Statistics.
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• the credit spread, defined as yield on Baa-rated bonds minus yield on Aaa-rated bonds. Data are from Fred.
To capture sentiment, I use
• the equity share in new issues. Among the components of the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) , this is the one with the longest data history. Data are from Jeff Wurgler's website. 20 or, alternatively,
• the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006 Newey and West (1987) and a lag length chosen according to Newey and West (1994) . The regressions are highly significant, and the coefficients have the expected sign:
Building activity is higher after periods of high loan growth, low credit spreads, and high 
IV. Robustness
To assess the robustness of the results from Section III, I begin by examining alternative variable definitions and predictors. Subsequently, I present results for international stock markets. The variations are tested for the three-year return horizon.
Variations of Additional Predictors
1) Instead of using the log dividend price ratio as an additional predictor, I use the log 10-year price-earnings ratio computed by Robert Shiller.
2) I replace the log dividend price ratio with the log dividend yield, defined as the log of dividends minus the log of lagged index values.
3) Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010) show that a simple average of return predictions from individual regressions models produces superior out-of-sample performance. I consider the full set of 15 variables studied by Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010):
Dividend-price ratio; dividend yield; earnings-price ratio; dividend-payout ratio; historical S&P 500 volatility; book-to-market ratio of the Dow Jones Industrial Average; net NYSE equity issues scaled by NYSE market capitalization; three-month treasury bill rate; long-term government bond yield; lagged return on long-term government bonds; term spread, default yield spread (Baa minus Aaa); difference between long-term corporate bond and long-term government bond returns; inflation rate; investment-to-capital ratio (ratio of aggregate investment to aggregate capital for the entire economy.
Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou ( (1+return) = (1 + PE-ratio growth rate) × (1 + earnings growth rate) × (1 + dividend price ratio)
They suggest predicting the return components separately and then aggregating the partial predictions to obtain a return forecast. I implement one of their most successful specifications, in which the expected PE-ratio growth rate is set to zero, the expected earnings growth is estimated using the growth rate over the previous 20 years, and the expected dividend price ratio is estimated using the current dividend price ratio. The horizon is set to three years, which means that the earnings growth rate is taken to be the trailing average of past three-year earnings growth rates. The return forecast is converted into a forecast for the equity premium by assuming the current risk-free rate to hold over the horizon.
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Variations of the Tower Variable
5)
In the construction of the variable LargeStart, public buildings such as city halls and capitols were excluded. In a variation, I include such buildings.
6) Journalists and analysts often pay special attention to towers that break a height record. To measure record-tower building, I identify the years in which construction began on a tower that would set a new US height record. The information is recorded in the following dummy variable:
One if construction of a tower breaking the contemporary US record was begun in year t, zero otherwise. 22 In a sensitivity analysis, I assume perfect foresight of risk-free rates. Conclusions are not affected.
The list of record-breaking towers is given in Table A1 [ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] Over the entire sample, the price-earnings ratio leads to a better performance than does the dividend price ratio, but it does not exceed the one of the tower model. Between 1910 and 1945, the price-earnings ratio leads to a superior performance, but the performance after 1945 is disappointing. Using the dividend yield instead of the dividend price ratio reduces performance.
The combination forecast of Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010) where THRESHOLD it is the average height of towers of more than 50 meters, begun in years t-1,t-30 in country i. For the analysis of the world ex US index, "country i" in these definitions is replaced by "world ex US". As above, I study logarithmic excess returns over the US risk-free rate, and focus on three-year returns. They are denoted by r i,t,t+3 .
Separately for each country and the world ex US index, I run the dividend+tower model regression:
As in the previous sections, the coefficients are estimated with OLS, their standard errors according to Hodrick (1992) .
I will also report mean coefficients across countries, whose precision is difficult to assess. I suggest the following simulation procedure to estimate confidence intervals under the null hypothesis that the tower variable does not have any influence on returns: 1) Randomly reshuffle the countries, i.e. for each country i, randomly draw a country without replacement from the entire set of countries, j=1,…,37.
2) For country i, determine the tower variable by using the corresponding values of country j. If country j was chosen for country i, for example, the value of LargeStart it is replaced by the value of LargeStart jt for each t.
3) Run regressions (14) with the original return and dividend variables and the reshuffled tower variables and determine the mean (across countries) of the estimated coefficients. 4) Repeat 1) to 3) 10,000 times.
In the table, I report the 99% confidence intervals of the simulated mean coefficients.
Results are presented in Table 6 . An inspection of the country-by-country regressions does not reveal striking patterns related to the influence of tower building. Some coefficients are significant, but this would be expected, given the large number of regressions. The mean coefficient of tower models, however, is negative (-0.15) and outside the simulated 99% confidence interval. It is close to the coefficient on LargeStart when the analysis of US data is restricted to the 1972-2010 time period (-0.17, reported at the bottom of the table). Note, too, that the coefficient for the United States is insignificant even though LargeStart leads to superior outof-sample forecasts in the 1970-2010 period (cf. Table 2 ).
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] An analysis of the world ex US index corroborates the finding that LargeStart helps predicts future returns. The construction of large towers significantly (t-stat=-3.11) predicts lower future returns. Overall, the findings are therefore similar to the US evidence for the same time period.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that construction starts of skyscrapers predict subsequent stock returns. The predictive ability exceeds that of alternatives such as the prevailing historical mean, predictions based on dividend price ratios and recently suggested combination forecasts (Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou, 2010; Ferreira and Santa-Clara, 2011) . Predictability is mainly driven by the post-World War II period, and it does not seem to decline in more recent periods.
One explanation for the documented patterns is that tower building is indicative of overoptimism. Widespread over-optimism could lead not only to tower building, but also to overvalued stock markets. The rational asset pricing explanation is that during periods of low risk aversion, financing of large-scale projects such as skyscrapers is easier, and expected returns are lower. It is generally difficult to disentangle rational and irrational explanations for patterns in long-run returns. In this paper, I provide indirect evidence that is consistent with both views.
A non-negativity constraint on return forecasts, which can be motivated by rational asset pricing theory, does not lead to an unambiguous improvement of forecasts. Furthermore, the construction of large towers is found to be correlated both with investor sentiment and with credit market conditions. White, H., 1980, A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817-38. Note: The log excess return on the US stock market from t to t+k is regressed on the log dividend price ratio (dp) and a variable containing information about the building starts of large towers in the United States. LargeStart t relates the number of towers that were larger than a trailing average and that were started in year t to the number of Out-of-sample forecasts of three-year stock returns are generated using (i) a model including only the dividend price ratio (dividend model); (ii) model based on the building counts of large towers (tower model); (iii) a model combining the two predictors (dividend+tower model). Constrained forecasts are forced to be non-negative. Stock market data are constructed by Robert Shiller based on the S&P 500 and other series. Statistical significance of the R² os statistic (out-of-sample R² relative to the historical mean) is based on the Clark and West (2007) MSPEadjusted statistic, computed with Newey and West (1987) standard errors. MAE is mean absolute error. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level. Note: Table entries are the estimated annual fees (in percent) that mean-variance investors with a risk aversion of three would be willing to pay for using regression forecasts of the equity premium rather than the trailing historical mean. The results obtain from an out-of-sample analysis in which optimized portfolios using ( 1919-2010 1927-2010 1934-2010 1934-2010 1934-2010 Real Note: The three-year log excess return of country i is regressed on the country's log dividend price ratio (dp it ) and information about the building starts of towers in country i. LargeStart it relates the number of towers that were larger than a country trailing average and that were started in year t, to the number of such starts in the 30 years before t. Return data are from Datastream, and tower data are from Emporis. T-statistics are based on Hodrick (1992) . The simulated range for mean coefficients is from a simulation in which values for the tower-building related variables are randomly reshuffled across countries. Coefficients of regression constants are not reported. ***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level. where r t,t+k is the log excess return on the US stock market from year t to t+k; dp is the log dividend price ratio; LargeStart t relates the number of towers that were larger than a trailing average and that were started in year t to the number of such starts in the 30 years before t. Data from 1871 to 2010 are constructed by Robert Shiller based on the S&P 500 and other series. 
